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STATE PROHIBITIONS QN THE INTERSTATE EXPORTATION OF
SCARCE WATER RESOURCES

Steven E. Clyde
with
Edward W. Clyde

STATE PROHIBITIONS ON THE INTERSTATE EXPORTATION OF
SCARCE WATER RESOURCES

I. Introduction. The decade of the 1970's saw a
tremendous population shift to the West and Southwest. This
coupled with increased industrialization and development of
energy resources within the area is creating a heavy demand
upon the area's limited water resources.
A. The response of the Western States to these
demands have been mixed:
1.

Some have accepted growth as inevitable,

and have emphasized land use planning, proper zoning,
reallocation of the available water resources, and creative
tax measures and other laws to cope with the impact of rapid
growth and development.
2.

Others resist growth and in many instances

have endeavored to use water as a land use regulator to stop
development. As a result, state water policy is often
misused for unrelated political purposes) B. Scope of Paper: To examine various legislative
prohibitions on the exportation of water for interstate use;
prohibitions on interstate movement of water created by
provisions in interstate compacts; discuss the constitutional
issues raised by embargo type legislation and interstate

1 Clyde, the Anatomy of an Energy Project, 26 Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute, 365 (1980).
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compact provisions; review existing appropriation statutes,
and their suitability to the allocation of water for future
development among competitive applicants.
II. Legislative Bars to the Exportation of Water
Resources.
Western States have employed various legislative schemes
to prohibit the exportation of their water resources to other
and often non-contiguous states. This has inparticularly
been done in an effort to block the development of coal
properties within their boundaries.2
A. Embargo type legislation falls within three
somewhat generalized but distinct categories: The first
allows the exportation of water but only upon legislative
approval; the second allows the exportation of water but only
upon a reciprocal basis; and, the third endeavors to create
an absolute prohibition upon the interstate transportation of
water for coal slurry pipelines.
1. The ostensible purpose of this legislation
is to preserve for the States the limited water resources
which are necessary for the health and prosperity of its
citizens, and to promote the general welfare.3

2 S41-3-105 Wyo. Stat.; §72- 12-19 N.M.S.A. (1978);
S46-5-20.1 S.D. Comp. Laws; S85-1-121 and 85-2-104 MT. C.A.;
Okla. Stat. Title 27, S7; S 533.515 Nev. Rev. Stat.;
S90.03.300 R.C.W.A.; §37-81 -101 Col.; §537.810 Ore. Rev.
tat.; §37-81-101 Colo. A.S
S37-81-101 Colo.; S41-3-11 5 Wyo. Stat.
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2.

The effect of this legislation has been to

delay new coal related energy projects.
3.

The motivation behind the embargo

legislation is multi faceted.4
(a) The chief proponents include both
enviromentalists who oppose development and favor a no growth
policy, and the natives who desire to maintain their agrarian
lifestyles and avoid the disruptive social change associated
with energy development.
(b) General fear of boom towns and the
accompanying influx of people who embrace different social
values and backgrounds, in numbers that often overwhelm
municipal facilities. Boom towns often attract gambling,
prostitution, drugs and other undesirable behavior. The
population influxes are often temporary making the
construction of schools, hospitals, sewer and water systems
and other municipal improvements impractical, and the small
community is unable to cope with these economic and other
problems.
(c) Enviromental concerns--fear of massive
coal development in response to heavy demands and the
national energy crisis.

4Trelease, Back to Basics-Taking the Politics Out of Water
Law Conference on Water Perspectives in the "Old West
States", S.D. 1979
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(d)

The use of coal slurry pipelines for

transportation which are viewed as a threat to the long
established railroad industry.
(e) Reluctance of one segment of society
or one area to sacrifice for the economic benefit of other
segments of society or other areas. Utah, for example, does
not want the air pollution and associated problems of coal
fired generating facilities which will generate power for the
California markets.
(f) Fear and outright resentment of
Federal intervention in their lives.
4. The embargo type legislation will
not accomplish its intended purpose. The statutes generally
suffer from constitutional infirmities, and in the face of a
national energy crisis, could invite the very Federal
intervention which local politicians and populations seek to
avoid.5
B. Specific Approaches Used by Various States:
1. Some states prohibit the interstate
exportation of water except upon express legislative
approval.
(a) A Wyoming statute prohibits the
appropriation of either surface or underground water for use

5 Trelease, supra, Note 4; Clyde, supra, Note 1; Zunker, Its
Our Water-Can Wyoming Constitutionally Prohibit the
Exportation of State Water, Vol. X, Land & Water Law Review,
119 (1975)
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outside of the State as a medium of transportation of
mineral, chemical or other products to another State without
specific and prior legislative approval.6
(b) Under South Dakota law, the
legislature must approve any application to appropriate water
in excess of 10,000 acre-feet annually. The same act denies
the power of eminent domain to any common carrier which has
failed to obtain such prior approval.7
(c) An Oregon statute provides that no
water located within the State shall be diverted, impounded
or in any manner appropriated for diversion and use beyond
the boundaries of the State except upon the express consent
of the legislature. The consent may be coupled with such
terms, conditions, exceptions, reservations, restrictions and
provisions as the legislature may care to make in protection
of the interest of the state and its inhabitants.8
2. Other states require reciprocal treatment
from the state in which the water is to be used.
(a) Nevada law provides that no permit for
the appropriation of water shall be denied because the place
of intended use is situated within any other state, when such

§41-3-115 Wyo. Stat.
§46-6-20.0 S.D. Comp. Laws
9537.810 Ore. Rev. Stat.
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other state authorizes the diversion of water from such state
for use in Nevada.9
(b) In Washington, the State Engineer may
not deny a permit for appropriation of water solely on the
grounds that the intended place of use may be situated in
another state or nation. However, the supervisor of water
resources has discretion to decline such a permit unless the
laws of such state authorize the diversion of water from that
state for use within the State of Washington.1°
3. Still other states have endeavored to
create an outright embargo upon the interstate transportation
of water.
(a) The State of New Mexico has declared
that no person shall withdraw water from any under ground
source for use in any other state. This statute is currently
being challenged on constitutional grounds.11
(b)

Oklahoma employed a unique approach.

It conferred the power of eminent domain upon coal slurry

?A533.515 Nev. Rev. Stat.
'990.03.300 R.C.W.A.; in contrast, see 573-2-8 U.C.A.
1953 which was amended in 1979 to delete the requirement of
reciprocal benefits and now authorizes the State Engineer to
approve applications to appropriate Utah water for use in any
nate.
"572-12-19 N.M.S.A.; City of El Paso, Texas v. S.E.
Reynolds, the State Engineer of New Mexico, Civil No. 80-730
HB, United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico

pipeline companies. As common carriers, the slurry pipeline
companies are regulated and must secure licenses from the
State. The license is withheld until the carrier
demonstrates the adequacy of its water supply for the
projected life of the project. The statutes then expressly
prohibit the use of Oklahoma water to transport materials in
slurry form to other states.12
(c) The Montana legislature has expressly
determined that the use of water for the slurry transport of
coal is detrimental to the conservation and protection of the
water resources of the state, and consequently the use of
water for the slurry transport of coal is not a beneficial
use of water. Water, of course, can be appropriated only for
beneficial uses.13
(d) Colorado statutes provide that it is
unlawful to divert, carry or transport the water of any water
source of the state into any other state for use therein,

12 0k1a. Stat. Title 27, Eminent Domain 7.1 and 7.6; see
generally haerle, Legal and Prac tical Aspects of Coal Slurry
Construction and Use, Practicing Law Institute, Dallas, TX
1977, for a discussion on other developments in area of
eminent domain and coal slurry p ipelines. The railroads are
trying to block slurry pipelines from crossing the railroads.
The courts are holding that the railroads have only easements
for the track bed, and that they cannot deny the pipeline
companies the right to cross und er the roadbeds. See ETSI v.
U.P.R.R.C., 456 F. Supp. 154 (D. C. Kan. 1978), aff'd 606 F.2d
934 (10th C.A. 1979); ETSI v. U. P.R.R.C., 435 F. Supp. 313
oQ.C. Wyo. 1977), aff'd 606 F.2d 934 (10th C.A. 1979).
"585-2-104 Rev. Code MT 1979
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except that the owner of agricultural lands in Colorado and
and contiguous agricultural lands in bordering states may,
upon specific legislative approval use water in the other
state for agricultural use, if the other state has reciprocal
rights •14
III. Impact of Embargo Type Legislation on Interstate
Commerce.
A. Under the Commerce clause [Article III, Section
8 Cl. (3) of the U.S.], Congress was granted the authority to
regulate Commerce among the several states. It is generally
held, that any state law or regulation which unreasonably
burdens and interferes with interstate commerce is
constitutionally void.
1.

Whether or not a state act or regulation

interferes with commerce turns on the nature and severity of
the burden created, and the local purpose served by the
imposition of the act or regulation.
2.

If the regulation is protectionist in

nature, it is per se invalid. If the regulation serves a
legitimate local public interest, then the beneficial effect
of the local regulation is balanced against the burden
imposed upon interstate commerce.
3.

State acts will be upheld where they

promote legitimate local public concerns and only
incidentally impose burdens on or discriminate against

14 S37-81-101 Colo.

interstate commerce. However, state acts will be held
invalid where they discriminate against interstate commerce,
or where the burdens imposed on commerce are clearly
excessive in relation to the assumed local benefits. The
test is one of degree and depends upon the nature of the
local interest involved, •and whether it could be promoted
through a lessor impact on interstate activities.15
4. The Court should consider the practical
effect of the burdens state regulations impose on interstate
commerce, rather than merely labels or statements of purpose.
State acts and regulations making the furtherance of
interstate commercial activities economically prohibitive,
are constitutionally void.16

15 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); The Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366 (1976); Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179
(1950); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1
‘1928).
'Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); The Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra, Note 15;
Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana Power & Light Company,
406 U.S. 621 (1972), wherein the Court held that a state
regulatory plan to control the distribution of natural gas
constituted a prohibited interference with interstate
commerce, where the regulation operated to withdraw a large
volume of natural gas from established interstate activity.
See also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 552 (1918);
McDaniel, Commerce Clause and Water Availability Issues
Concerning Coal Slurry Pipelines, Vol. XII, #3 Natural
Resources Lawyer 533 (1979).
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B. As a general rule, both the articles and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce are subject to
congressional regulation and control:
1.

Federal regulatory control has been

extended to the extraction of natural resources, once those
resources assume a form suitable for transit in interstate
commerce.17
2.

Instrumentalities of commerce--highways,

telephone and navigable waterways--which facilitate the
movement of items in commerce are also subject to
congressional contro1.18
3.

Attempts by states to prevent the

exportation of natural gas have failed. The Supreme Court
held that such statutes constitute an unreasonable intrusion
into or the obstruction of interstate commerce by the
states 19

17 Pennsylvanis v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 552 (19 18)
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Company, 221 U.S. 229 (1911); City
of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 W.D. TX (1966) , affirmed
per curiam 385 U.S. 35 (1966); The Federal Power Co
mm
y Louisiana Power Case, sun, Note 16
8The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 5 (1871); McDaniel,
a,
pte 16
'
West v. Kansas National Gas Company, supra, Not e 17;
:enns ylvania v. West Virginia, supra, Note 17; Ha skell v.
Kansas Natural Gas Company, 224 U.S. 229 (1910); Federal
Power Commission v. Louisiana Power Case, supra, Note 16; but
see Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179
(1950).
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C. Applicability of commerce clause to water
embargo situations:
1.

Hudson County Water Company v. McCarter,

209 U.S. 389 (1909). The Supreme Court held that the State
of New Jersey could prohibit the exportation of its water to
New York City due to compelling local interests in preserving
its scarce water supply for the benefit of its own citizens.

2.

The Supreme Court apparently recognizes

that states are justifiably concerned with preventing rapid
and uneconomic dissipation of one of its chief natural
resources, and will sustain state regulations which affect
interstate and intrastate uses equally.20
However, the states regulatory authority is neither
exclusive or absolute, and will not preclude the exercise of
Federal controls under the commerce clause.21
3.

The conservation and wise development of

water resources in the semi-arid west is indispensible to the
general welfare of the area and to all activities of man.
For that reason, water has been accorded special

20 Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179
(1950); California-Oregon Power Company v. Portland Beaver
Cement Company, 295 U.S. 142 (1935); Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); McDaniel, supra, Note
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S.
385 (1978).
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consideration in the West. For example, a private
appropriator is afforded the right of eminent domain so as to
take his water from his point of diversion across the lands
of another to his place of use. The right is afforded
because the public has a substantial interest in the use of
water. 22
The Mill Pond decisions from the mid-west states turned
upon the same public interest principals.23
4.

Although water is a unique resource, it is

still not so unique as to justify special treatment under the
commerce clause. Water is not different from oil and gas
insofar as the export of the product is concerned. Water is
an article of commerce in that it is bought and sold as a
commodity in every municipal water system for municipal and
for general industrial use. As such, it clearly can be
exported in a pipeline from state to state.
5.

Water rights are property rights, and

entitled to all constitutional protection, including due
process, but it is a property right which is affected bY the
public interest. As such, its use is regulated both at the

22 Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Kaiser Steel
Corporation v. W.S. Ranch, Inc., 81 N.M. 414, 467 P.2d 986
(1970); §73-1-5 through 7 U.C.A. 1953; and, see generally
Vol. 6, Clark, Water and Water Rights, §518, p. 350
0,972).
"Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Company, 113 U.S. 9
(1885).
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initial appropriation process and as to later transfers to
new uses under change application statutes. The state can
prevent waste, mitigate interference, and provide for the
forfeiture for non-use.
6.

Although the Supreme Court upheld the right

of a state to preserve its water resources in McCarter, the
opposing view prevailed in City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F.
Supp., 828 (1966). This decision was affirmed per curiam in
385 U.S. 35 (1966). The Federal District Court held that a
Texas statute which prohibited the exportation of Texas
ground water to Oklahoma without prior legislative approval
constituted an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce.
The Court found the presence of both discrimination against
interstate commerce and an absence of a sufficient public
-\\

interest to justify the burdens imposed on interstate
commerce. The court followed the rational of the prior
natural gas cases which discuss the policy considerations as
follows:
"If the states have such a power, a
singular situation might result. Pennsylvania
might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber,
the mining states their minerals. And why may
not the products of ;he field be brought
within the principal"."
7.

Several law review articles have been

written which examine the McCarter and Altus decisions. The
concensus of opinion is that McCarter is no longer valid

24 West v. Kansas Natural Gas Company, supra, Note 17;
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, supra, Note 17.
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authority. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme
Court affirmed Altus without opinion, and thus did not
expressly overrule McCarter. It should also be noted that
at least one writer contends that the Altus decision was
based more upon an estoppel type theory rather than an
invocation of the negative implications of the commerce
clause, because the City of Altus had invested significant
sums in the acquisition of land and water rights in
conformance with Texas law. These expenditures occurred
prior to the Texas legislature's enactment of the provision
which prohibited the exportation of water.25
Notwithstanding this, it is doubtful that embargo type
legislation, such as that in McCarter, can be sustained if
subjected to the balancing test analysis.
E. Constitutionality of Specific Acts noted
above:
1. Those statutes that create an absolute ban
on the interstate movement of their water resources (such as
Montana, Colorado, New Mexico, and Oklahoma) are
protectionist in nature and discriminate against interstate

25 Trelease, supra, Note 4; McDaniel, supra, Note 16;
Zunker, supra, Note 5; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, supra,
Note 16; and West v. Kansas National Gas Company, supra, Note
17; but see Corker, Can a State Embargo the Export of Water
by Transbasin Diversion?, 12 Id. L.R. 135 (1976)
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commerce. Without question they are constitutionally
void.26
2.

Those statutes that require specific

legislative approval, such as Wyoming, Oregon and South
Dakota are also void under the balancing analysis. The
statutory provisions unreasonably burden interstate commerce
in furtherance of tenuous state interests. The statutes are
substantially identical to the Texas statute struck down by
the Federal Court in Altus v. Carr. However, legislative
supervision is not per se discriminatory against interstate
commerce. The legislature might restrict new appropriations
or transbasin diversions for conservation purposes without
discriminating in favor of instate uses. So long as a clear
and demonstrable state purpose exists which does not
unreasonably burden interstate commerce, no violation
should occur. Examples of this might include the
preservation of scenic and recreational values.27
3.

Those statutes that allow the interstate

movement of water upon a reciprocal basis are of questionable
validity.

26 McDaniel, supra, Note 16; Trelease, supra, Note 4; Penn
v. W. VA., 262 U.S . 552 (1918):::st s::::: eNa5 ti:::1 Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
141 S. 137 (1970).
4/ McDaniel, supra, Note 16; Zu
see Corker, supra, Note 25; and, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970 ); and, Cities Services Gas Company v.
Pierless Oil & Gas Company, 340 U.S. 179 (1950)
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(a)

The intent is not- to prohibit the
• s

interstate moyement of water, but to reap reciprocal economic
benefits from those states in which the water will be used.
.7.11..;•:i

11..1

•

••

The magnitude of energy projects are
"i
such that most will be interstate in nature.
(b)

(0 ,

,

Any attempt to prohibit the

interstate movement of water because one of the states
1_
,
L
.
•
involved does not provide for the reciprocal use of its water
may unreasonably burden interstate commerce, and thus be
constitutionally void.28
IV. Impact of Interstate Compacts Upon the Exportation
of Water.
_

A. , Purpose of Interstate Compacts: The purpose of
interstate compacts is to equitably
apportion the water of
_
interstate streams among the several states along the
interstate river system. Additionally, compacts help
facilitate planning, and settle present and future disputes
in regard to river administration. They may also help
establish preferences between different beneficial uses on a
system wide basis, and promote interstate comity.
B.

Equitable apportionment is accomplished in one

28 Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366 (1976), wherein the Supreme Court struck down a mandatory
reciprocal requirement pertaining to the processing of milk,
on the grounds that no state interests were of sufficient
importance to save "that devastating effect upon the free
flow of interstate milk".
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of three ways:29
1.

By negotiated contractual apportionment

ratified by the participants and the national congress
(interstate compact).

2.

Equitable apportionment by judicial decree.

Perhaps the most famous example is Arizona v. California,
which apportioned the waters of the Colorado River among the
lower basin states. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).30
3.

By congressional fiat, although the

constitutional basis for such congressional allocation is
questionable. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
California held that Congress had such authority.31
C. Apportionment is primarily a quantification of
the extent of each state's right to develop the water within
an interstate river system. This right, however, is always

29 National Water Commission, A Summary-Digest of State
Water Laws, Dewsnip and Jensen, Editors, U.S. Government
Finting Office 1973
-fl'Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Arizona v.
California, 292 U.S. 341 (1934); Arizona v. Ca lifornia, 298
Vol. 8,
U.S. 558 (1936); Clyde, The Colorado River ision,
Dec
Colorado,
206
#4, Ut. L.R. 299 (1963-64); see also Kansas v.
ruder
v.
La
U.S. 46 (1907); Wyoming v. Colorado, and Hinde
glatte & Cherry Creek Ditch Company, 304 U.S. 92 (1938)
-"Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); see
generally, Clyde, The Colorado River Decision, Vol. 8, #4,
Ut. L.R. 299 (1963-64); Corker, supra, Note 25

L17

subordinate to the dominant federal power to regulate
navigation and commerce upon interstate streams.32
1.

Interstate compacts may place restraints

upon the place of water use, and nearly always allocate the

33

water which each state may use from the interstate source.
Under the Colorado River Compact

, the water of the

Colorado River system was allocated by compact between the
upper and lower basin. The water allocated to the upper basin

34

was then apportioned among the states of the upper basin by
the Upper Colorado River Compact

. The Supreme Court

held in 1963 that Congress apportioned the water among the
lower basin states. See Arizona v. California, supra.
2.

Under the upper Colorado River Compact

for example Colorado could construct a dam on the White River

'

in Utah, and divert the water for use in Colorado for an oil
shale project. The water so used would be charged against
Colorado's allocated share of the Colorado River system.
3.

In 1979, the Utah Legislature amended

§73-2-8 U.C.A. 1953 by deleting the requirement of

32

National Water Commission, A Summary Digest of State
Water Laws, supra, Note 26; and see generally, Clyde, The
Colorado River Decision, Vol. VIII, No. 4 Utah L. Rev. 229
(1963-64); Articles XVIX(c) Upper Colorado River Compact Act
of April 6, 1949, Ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31; Article XVI,
Yellowstone River Compact, Act of June 2, 1949 (P.L. 83, 81st
qqngress)
"Colo. River Compact, Act of Aug. 19, 1921 (42 Stat.

i')4 .

Upper Colo. River Compact (63 Stat. 31).
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reciprocal treatment, so as to accommodate Nevada Power
Association's use of Utah's ground water in a coal slurry
pipeline to take Utah's coal to a power plant in Nevada.
This raises several interesting problems. The
source of supply is ground water from the deep navajo
sandstone formation. Presumptively, the water is tributary
to the Colorado River. The point of diversion may be located
so that it will involve water that has been allocated to the
upper basin. Thus the water will move not only from state to
state, but possibly from the upper basin to the lower Basin
as well.
The water will not be piped from Utah for an end
use in Nevada. Instead, the water will be used to transport
Utah coal in slurry form to a power plant outside Las Vegas,
Nevada. How should the water be charged between states and
between basins? The answer could become important as each
state and basin approaches full development, for it is clear
that the citizens of each state are bound by interstate
compacts .35
The answer may also create constitutional problems.
If the appropriation in Utah is charged against Arizona's
allocation, and if Arizona had fully developed its allocated

35 Hinderlider v. La Platte River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Company, 304 U.S. 92 (1938); see generally, Clyde, Legal
Aspects of the Development of the Colorado River, Vol. 1, No.
1, Utah Law Review 26 (1949); and, Clyde, Present Conflicts
on the Colorado River, Vol. 32, No. 4, Rocky Mountain Law
Review 534 (1960).
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share, the appropriation could be void, as it would violate
the, compact allocations. Enforcement of the allocations might
thus obstruct the free flow of interstate commerce.
4. The states cannot do by interstate compact,
what they cannot do by direct legislation notwithstanding
congressional ratification of the same. By consenting to the
compact, Congress does not surrender any federal interests.
Congress cannot delegate away its supreme authority to
regulate navigation and commerce.36
Thus, any compact provision which would place an
unreasonable burden upon interstate compact could be
unconstitutional, notwithstanding congressional
ratification.
D. The Yellowstone River Compact:
1. The Yellowstone Compact 37 , executed in
1950 by the States of Montana, Wyoming and North Dakota, may
well create similar constitutional problems.
Articles X of the compact provides that no water shall
be diverted from the Yellowstone River Basin without the
unanimous consent of all other signatory states. This
provision applies only to rights initiated in the Yellowstone
River Basin after 1950.

36 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
,ç}851)
Act of June 2, 1949 (P.L. 83, 81st Congress)
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2.

The apparent purpose of this provision was

to retain the benefit of return flow waters in the
Yellowstone River Basin, rather than to impede interstate
commerce—but as applied, it could do just that.
3.

The Northern Great Plains contain a

substantial quantity of both water and coal. However,
political and legal constraints are curtailing the coal
development by creating legal water shortages.
4.

Massive coal deposits lie near Gillette,

Wyoming, just outside the Yellowstone Basin. Article X of
the compact is being asserted to prohibit Wyoming and those
who have appropriated water under Wyoming law from using
Wyoming's allocated share of the Yellowstone River for coal
slurry pipeline development.38
This, of course, may not always involve the
interstate movement of water, but the effect has been to deny
this water for coal slurry pipeline use to transport Wyoming
coal and water to Arkansas.
5.

Article X of the Yellowstone Compact is

currently under attack on this constitutional ground. The
plaintiff contends that it creates an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce. The case is Intake Water Company v.
Yellowstone River Compact Commission, Civil No. 1184, United
States District Court for the District of Montana. Motions
to Dismiss have been filed by the various defendants on

38 McDaniel, supra, Note 16; Clyde, supra, Note 1
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jurisdictional grounds, and the court has yet to rule on
these motions.
V. Appropriation and Reallocation of Water to New and
Competing Uses Under the Existing Appropriation's System.
The existing appropriation statutes provide adequate
tools to protect the limited unappropriated water for future
uses, and to reallocate the water to new and often competing
uses. These tools include the ability to deny new
applications where they are contrary to the public interest,
or would interfere with more beneficial uses of the water.
Additionally, states may withdraw their water from
appropriation, either through direct legislative withdrawals,
or through the statutorily authorized ins tream appropriations
by state agencies. Concepts of beneficial use are being
redefined to include social and environmental values which
were not traditionally recognized as beneficial uses. States
are also administratively allocating their water rights
through short term permits, and through the imposition of
conditions upon changes of use which may protect not only
vested rights, but the public rights as well. The state's
ability to implement its new water policy is subject to the
assertion of the superior federal rights, which may
ultimately remove the remaining undeveloped Western water
from state control.
A. General historical evolution of the
appropriation doctrine:

1.

Historically, water rights were initiated

simply by diverting and applying the water to some beneficial
use. The concept of priority of rights was established to
protect the vested rights of those first on the stream. Those
who were subordinate thereto, simply fell in line.
2.

The Federal Government was the proprietor

of the western lands 39 . Congress by its silence was
held to have assented to the general occupation of its
land."
3.

In 1866, Congress expressly confirmed the

acquisition of water rights in accordance with local
custom. 41 The courts were bound to protect rights
which vested under local law, whether the rights were
initiated prior to or after the passage of the act.42
4.

The nature of the water right acquired was

a vested property right, protected by due process.43
Protection of prior rights was given express judicial
sanction as a matter of "natural justice".44

39 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954); U.S. v. Rio
Ggande Dam and Irrigation Company, 174 U.S. 102.
n'Atkinson v. Peterson, 87 U.S. 507 (1874).
NAct of July 26, 1866, Ch. 262 (14 Stat. 251).
413roder v. Water Company, 101 U.S. 274 (1897)
4 3 Hunter v. U.S., 388 F.2d 148 (9th C.A. 1967)
'Atkinson v. Peterson, supra, Note 40
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5.

The concept of the state having an interest

in the manner in which its water resources were appropriated
for private use has been a part of the law from the outset.
The states have always had the power to prevent waste, to
insure the water would be implied to a beneficial use and to
reject applications which were not in the public
interest.45
6.

The state permit statutes had little

practical impact on the early development of water law.
Rights were initiated simply by the diversion and application
of water to some beneficial use. There simply was no need to
involve the state. Western water law evolved over many years
as a matter of practical necessity and compromise. The
permit systems came later and simply imposed regulatory
controls over the existing custom and usage.
7.

Today, most western states have permit

systems in place that control the appropriation process.
Nearly all of the statutes require the rejection of an
application if there is no unappropriated water in the
source; if the proposed use would interfere with a prior
vested right; if the proposal is not physically or
economically feasible; and, if the applicant himself lacks
the economic capability of completing the proposed work. Many
states also provide for the rejection if the application will

45 Comp. Laws of the State of Deseret (Utah) 1851 Ch. 1,
§38; Comp. Laws of Wyoming 1876 Ch. 65, §4; Colorado Revised
Statutes 1867 Ch. XLV; and, Laws of Montana 1885 p. 131
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interfere with a more beneficial use of the water, or would
be contrary to the public interest." Moses Lasky
propheticly noted in 1929 that:47
"We have left behind a system of
individual property rights in water and are
fast approaching a system of economic
distribution of (perhaps state-owned) water by
a state administrative machinery under
state-granted conditional privileges of
water."
8. We have now moved even further, and the
permit process is now being successfully used to distribute
water to non-revenue producing beneficial uses. The permit
system is inherently flexible and provides the states with
continuing opportunities to mold new water policies as social
values change, and to prevent or limit uses which it
determines to be not in the public interest.48
B. Denial of Applications not in the Public
Interest:
1. Historically, environmental values were not
equated with the public interest. The courts and

"Legislation of this type can be found in the statutes
of Arizona (Arizona Revised Statutes §45-143); Kansas
Statutes Annotated 82(a) 711 and 712; Nebraska Revised
Statutes §46-235; Nevada Revised Statutes §533.370; New
Mexico Statutes Annotated §75-5-6; North Dakota Century Code
§61-04-07; South Dakota Comp. Laws §46-5-18; Utah Code
Annotated §73-3-8; Washington Revised Code §90.03.290;
Wxoming Statutes Annotated §41-203
''Rocky Mountain Law Review, 161, and continued into
Rgcky Mountain Law Review 35
"Sax, Water Law Planning and Policy, p. 222
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administrative agencies focused merely on economic concerns
in approving and rejecting applications under public interest
statutes.49
2.

Perhaps the land mark decision was by the

Utah Supreme Court in 1943, in Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494,
136 P.2d 957 (1943). There, the Utah Supreme Court approved
a junior multipurpose application over a senior single
purpose application in the same stream. Although the court
did not clearly state that the public interest consideration
should be the dominant consideration, it did hold that where
the large multipurpose project was beyond the blue print
stage and ready for construction, it should be given a
preference over a private competing power project.
3.

Another early case affirming the State

Engineer's rejection of an application to build a dam because
of public interest is Big Horn Power Company v.
State.5°
The reservoir would have interferred with the only
economically feasible railroad route connecting the Northwest
portion of Wyoming to the rest of the state.

49 Clyde, Water Acquisition for Mineral Development
Institute Paper 2, p. 10 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Fpundation 1978)
''23 Wyo. 271, 148 P. 1110 (1915).
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In Young and Norton v. Hinderlider 51 , the
Supreme Court of New Mexico applied a public interest statute
in a case involving competing irrigation projects. The court
approved the project which would provide the most economic
benefit in relation to its cost.
In East Bay Municipal Utility District v.
Department of Public Works 52 , an application for power
was conditionally approved. The condition was that the
permit could be revoked if the water was later needed for
domestic or irrigation use.
The California court again disregarded priority in
the time of filing in Johnson Rancho County Water District v.
State Water Rights Board 53 , and indicated that the
Water Board should give consideration to the benefits and
economic feasibility of competing projects.
4. Without question, we have reached a point
where almost no one is willing to give the production of
wealth a monopoly on social purpose. There-are values in
water other than economic values and there is a need in the
state allocation process to protect these other

?,
1 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910)
Ca1.2d 476, 35 P.2d 1027 (1934)
53 45 Cal Rept. 589, 235 Cal. App. 2d 863 (1965)
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values.54
5.

States now recognize social and

environmental values in approving new appropriations. In
1976, the Utah Legislature amended 573-3-8, thereby granting
the State Engineer authority to deny applications which will
unreasonably affect public recreation, or the natural stream
environment, or those applications which are detrimental to
the public welfare.55
6.

Most surface streams in Utah are

essentially fully appropriated. These prior vested rights
must also be protected. Consequently, instream
appropriations to protect public recreation, fish propagation
and natural stream environments may not be possible in a
state such as Utah.56
C. Withdrawal of water from further
appropriation and instream appropriations.
1. Water is being withdrawn from further
private appropriations, either by legislative withdrawals of
the water, or, by instream appropriations by state agencies
pursuant to statute. At least one of the purposes of these

?tClyde, supra, Note 49
n See also Washington Revised Code; 75.20.050 (1976) and
Tarlock, Water Acquisition for Mineral Development Institute
Paper 6, p. 17 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation
N78)
Tarlock, supra, Note 55
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withdrawals is to preserve the water until existing uses
and future public needs can be ascertained and analyzed; at
which time the water can be released and become available for
appropriation.
1.

Water is being withdrawn from private

appropriation at both the Federal and State level. The
Federal Government has done so under Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act.57
2.

The Federal Courts have also denied

licenses where the proposed project would have adverse
environment effects.58
3.

The States of California and Oregon have

enacted there own version of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
and thereunder have withdrawn portions of several state and
interstate streams. 59 These acts to provide for
limited withdrawals for such uses as domestic, municipal and
stockwatering purposes. Withdrawals of water must be subject
to periodic review, otherwise, they may become politically
motivated and used to defeat energy development by
withdrawing water from appropriation in those areas where
energy development is likely to occur.
4.

Some state constitutions provide that the

right to appropriate the unappropriated water of the state

57
co l6 U.S.C. §1271 through 1281 (1974)
J °Namekegon Hydro Company v. Federal Power Commission,
216 F.2d 509, (7th C.A. 1954); Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608, (1966),
pert. denied 384 U.S. 941
'Oregon Revised Statute Ch. 538 and §309.805 (1975);
California Public Resource Code §3093.50-65. See also
§73-6-1 U.C.A. 1953.
1.90

shall never be denied. 6 ° Idaho, by statute, authorized
the State Parks Board to appropriate and hold in trust the
unappropriated water in the Naiad Canyon area. The
appropriation contemplated leaving the water in its natural
channel. It was argued that this appropriation effectively
withdrew this water from appropriation in violation of the
Idaho Constitution. The Idaho Supreme Court in a
three-to-two decision upheld the statute and the
appropriation. 61 The legislature has thus expressly
permitted a state agency to file for an instream use of the
water for the purpose of preserving its scenic beauty and
recreational value for the public.
5.

The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that

where a natural stream, navigable under state law, runs
through private land, the land is subject to a servitude in
the nature of a public easement. The easement includes the
right of the public to utilize the navigable stream, up to
the high water mark, as a public highway and for all other
uses for which the stream is suited, including but not
limited to boating, swimming, hunting and fishing.62
6.

The doctrine was further applied in Ritter

60Article XVI, S6, Colorado Constitution; and Article XV,
Idaho Constitution.
State Department of Parks v. Idaho Department of Water
Administration, 530 P.2d 924 (1974); see also Idaho
Constitution S67-4307; 589-890 R.C. Mt; and, Colo. R.S.
S37-92-102(3); see also Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137
0,961).
"Southern Idaho Fish & Game Association v. Picabo
Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295 (1974)
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v. Standa1. 63 There the Court held that a private
appropriator could not block the public easement in a stream
navigable under state law, and ordered the removal of a fish
hatchery operation which spanned an estuary of the Snake
River thereby blocking the public's access to the estuary and
the riparian lands.
7. There are problems in authorizing single
purpose agencies such as a fish and game department to
appropriate it for instream uses. Single purpose agencies do
not necessarily reflect the broad public interest and may
appropriate all of the unappropriated water in a stream
thereby prohibiting all other future appropriations and uses.
This is especially troublesome in states where the
appropriator need only show that he is first in time, that
there is unappropriated water in the source and that there is
no public interest limitations on the right to appropriate.
Thus the State Engineer must retain the discretion to reduce,
restrict or even reject an applications for instream
appropriations under statutory guidelines if the application
is not in the broader public interest. Rights may vest in
instream appropriations thereby giving state agencies
standing to challenge changes of use in the stream that may

63 566 P.2d 769 (Id. 1977)
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impair public recreation and the natural stream
environment."
S. Preferably, the withdrawal of
unappropriated water should be left to legislative
determination which is more representative of the people's
will. Unlike instream appropriations, property rights would
not vest in water withdrawn by the legislature. The water
would simply be held in the public trust. A future change in
state water policies and goals could restore in whole or in
part the water which had been previously withdrawn from
appropriation without impairing vested instream rights.
D. Redefinition of Beneficial Use to Reflect
Changing Social and Environmental Values:
1. Changing social values now recognize that
there are values in water other than the production of
wealth. The need exists in the state allocation process to
protect these values. These values, however, cannot be
protected by express bans on the use of water, nor by
defining certain uses as non-beneficial uses under the
law. 65 However, substantial protection may be afforded
to these values through the expanded concepts of beneficial
use.

"Clyde, Water Acquisition for Mineral Development, Paper
p. 14, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute (1978).
° JTrelease, supra, Note 4
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2.

Water can be appropriated only for

beneficial use. This test has been easily met where the
water has been used to fulfill a desired or need of mankind,
or to produce wealth.66
3.

The traditional beneficial uses have been

irrigation, domestic, storage, stockwatering, mining and
milling, and the floating of logs for commercial use.
Today, uses such as fish propagation, maintenance of minimum
stream flows and environment, public recreation, industrial,
manufacturing and the transportation of salt in solution
have received both judicial and legislative recognition as
beneficial uses.67
E. Administrative Allocation of Water through
Short Term Permits, and Imposition of Conditions in Approving
Changes of Use:
1. The appropriation system has also provided
for the administrative allocation of water, through public
interest limitations on the right to appropriate, but this

1-3 U.C.A. 1953; Trelease, Concepts of Beneficial
Use in the Law of Surface Streams, 12 Wyo. L.J. 1
g;957)
' 1 §73-3-8; Deseret Livestock v. State, 110 Utah 239, 171
P.2d 401 (1946); State Department of Parks v. Idaho
Department of Water Administration, 530 P.2d 924 (1974);
Southern Idaho Fish & Game Association, et al. v. Picabo
Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295 (1974); and, Ritter v.
Standall, 566 P.2d 769 (Id. 1977); Tarlock, supra, Note 55;
Dewsnip and Jensen, State Laws and Instream Flows, Biological
Services Program of The Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S.
Department of Interior (March 1977)

L33

has been a secondary function of the law. The permit system
was primarily designed to bring order and efficiency in the
appropriation and distribution of water, and to protect
vested rights against junior appropriations."
2.

The Utah Legislature in 1976 amended

§73-3-8 U.C.A. 1953 to provide for the appropriation of water
for a limited time. The permits are limited to
appropriations for industrial, power, mining development, and
manufacturing purposes.
3.

An appropriation under this statute creates

a short term vested property right instead of a perpetual
one, but while in force, the right is entitled to full legal
protection."
4.

Upon cessation of the appropriation period,

the water reverts back to the public for reappropriation
where it once again becomes subject to the right of the State
Engineer to reject applications on public interest grounds,
or because the appropriation would impair a more beneficial
use. This section then provides for the administrative
reallocation of the water through the appropriation process

"U.S. v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132
0,951)
u 'See generally, Clyde and Jensen, Administrative
Allocation of Water, Report to the National Water Commission
C-L- -8 :), Jensen, Water Acquisition for Mineral
Development, Paper 8, p. 1, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute (1978).
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rather than the market place and changes of use. It helps
promote the reuse of water for multiple and perhaps the
sequential rather than simultaneous development of resources,
in lieu of attempts to initiate new appropriations for these
uses. It promotes conservation of water and, may assist the
states in preserving the remaining water for instream and
other public interest uses. It may also slow the pace of
development without unreasonably burdening interstate
commerce.
5.

There is little unappropriated water in

Utah, and consequently the provision was enacted too late to
be of much assistance. However, in states having
unappropriated waters a provision of this nature might be
well employed to reallocate water to new uses to conserve the
undeveloped water of the state. However, a right so
appropriated would have a 1981 date of priority and in the
water short West a 1981 date of priority would be of
questionable value to energy developers who cannot tolerate
interruptible water supplies.
6.

Generally speaking, anyone entitled to the

use of water may change his place and nature of use, and his
point of diversion under the appropriations system. The
right to change is an inherent legal right, but it is not an
absolute right. The right is qualified in that the change
may be made only so long as no other rights are impaired
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thereby 70
7.

Under the change of use statutes, an

appropriator may reallocate his own water to other beneficial
uses any number of times, without the loss of his original
date of priority. This is of importance to energy developers
who must acquire relatively dependable water supplies. This
can only be accomplished through the acquisition of early
priority rights and then a change of the nature of use as
required. 71
8.

Vested rights, whether subordinate or

senior, are protected against interference caused by a change
of use. If interference occurs, the statutes require either
monetary compensation or replacement of the lost water.
Further, a party is entitled to move only that quantity of
water actually consumed. The balance of the water must
remain within the system to compensate those who have vested
rights in the return flow. In short, an appropriator cannot
enlarge his consumptive use by change application.
9.

The State Engineer may impose reasonable

conditions upon approval of a change application to protect
private vested rights, and theoretically, to protect the

70473-3 U.C.A. 1953; Lehmitz v. Utah Copper Company, 118
F.2d 518 (1941); U.S. v. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 231 P. 434;
East Bench Irrigation Company v. Deseret Irrigation Company,
2,Ut.2d 170, 271 P.2d 449.
"§73-3-3 U.C.A. 1953
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public rights in the stream as wel1.72
10. The states might impose conditions upon a
change of use that would require the appropriator to utilize
more efficient means of transportation and use of water.
Examples might be to require the use of sprinkler irrigation
systems in lieu of flood irrigation methods, or enclosed
pipelines versus open ditches. This would promote the
conversation of water and other water policies.
Additionally, the state might impose conditions which would
help insure the maintenance of minimum stream flows and the

protection of public rights in the stream.73
F. Revival of Federal-State Conflicts over Water
Rights:
1. The majority of water yet to be developed
in the arid west will likely be under federal control. The
water will be developed under large block appropriations,
which will include all of the unappropriated water in a
watershed area. The projects will be large multipurpose
projects financed primarily with federal funds. The water
will be allocated by federal agencies or state sponsoring

72 573-3-3 U.C.A. 1953; Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136
P.2d 957 (1943); Tanner v. Humphries, 87 Utah 164, 48 P.2d
484 (1935); East Bench Irrigation Company v. Deseret
;rrigation Company, 2 Ut.2d 170, 271 P.2d 449
"Tarlock, supra, Note 55; Dewsnip and Jensen, supra,
Note 67
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agencies, but in accordance with federal, rather than state
law. Thus state appropriation statutes and water policies
may play a more diluted role in the future.74
2.

The Federal Government has a duel interest

in western water. Its first role is that of a sovereign
entity, exercising the specific powers granted to the Federal
Government by the United States Constitution. The Government
is also in the position of a proprietary owner of western
lands and the waters arising thereon.
3.

The sovereign powers are conferred by

constitution, and cannot be delegated away. 75 The
Federal Government has the supreme authority to make
treaties, and to regulate commerce and navigation. Federal
enterprises are essentially free from state contro1.76
4.

The Federal Government acquired much of the

West by purchase or otherwise, and holds title as a
proprietary owner. Under the property clause of the U.S.
Constitution, the government can dispose of its property

74 Clyde, supra, Note 64; Trelease, Water Acquisition for
Mineral Development, Paper 9, p. 1, Rocky Mountain Mineral
44w Institute (1978).
"Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
41851)
"Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); California v. U.S., 438 U.S.
645 (1978); and, Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken,
357 U.S. 275 (1957)
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(both land and water) like any other proprietor.77
Congress, in the act of 1866 released its land to settlement
and

in the Deseret Land Act of 1877, severed the

unappropriated and non-navigable water from the land, so that
thereafter, patents conveyed no interest in the appurtenant
water rights, leaving the same subject to state
control
5.

It then appeared that Congress had

permitted the states to control the appropriation of
non-navigable water. It must be remembered, however, that
although Congress can release this proprietary interest in
land and water, and allow the States to control the
appropriation and use thereof, the relinquishment of the
proprietary interest does not also relinquish the sovereign
powers of the United States. Congress still has the power to
regulate commerce and control navigation. The failure of
Congress to exercise that full power will not preclude it
from doing so in the future.79
6.

Thus the creation of federal water projects

and the assertion of federal reserved rights may remove the

77 Art. IV, §3, Cl. (2 U.S. Constitution; Alabama v.
T g. xa l , 347 U.S. 272 (1954)
"Ca ifornia-Oregon Power Company v. Portland Beaver
qgment Company, 295 U.S. 142 (1935)
'Clyde, supra, Note 64; U.S. v. Twin City Power Company,
350 U.S. 222 (1956); U.S. v. Gerlack Livestock Company, 39
U.S. 725 (1950); Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corporation, 347 U.S. 239 (1954).
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•

remaining unappropriated water in the West from state
control. Certainly further attempts by the states to
withhold their limited water from energy development projects
will invite further federal intervention into the state water
allocation business. In fact, under the Reagan
administration this is not just an idle threat, but a very
real possibility.
V. Conclusion.
Professor Frank Trelease has said:
"In all of the western states a water
right is a property right, defensible and
protected, firm enough to give security to
investments and enterprises, flexible enough
to allow changes to new and more productive
uses, subject to governmental controls that
insure beneficial use and protect other
public interests including the envigpnment
That is what water law is all about.""
The states cannot deny their water resources to energy
developers for interstate use, nor should they endeavor to do
so. They can, however, through utilizing the exiting
appropriation laws effectively implement state water policy
and protect emerging social and enviromental values by
maintaining minimum stream flows denying applications which
are not in the public interest, and by withdrawing water from

•
appropriations. So long as these efforts are not solely
protectionist and promote some legitimate state goals, they
will not be held to unreasonably burden interstate commerce.

"Trelease, supra, Note 4.

The majority of the unappropriated Western water will
likely be developed in federally funded projects and subject
to federal allocations and controls. Congress can, as it has
in the reclamation statutes, require the federal agencies to
conform to state water laws. However, Congress need not do
this. Continued state efforts to deny water for energy
development will, in my opinion, result in federal
intervention with a resulting loss of some control by the
states over the allocation and use of their limited water
resources.
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